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Some social categories are almost always identifiable in face-to-face interaction (e.g. race 
and gender). Information about many other category memberships (e.g., religion, sexual 
orientation) can be uncertain, however. This work explores the influence of uncertainty about 
category information on face recognition. Current accounts of intergroup bias in face recognition 
(specifically, the feature selection model and categorization-individuation model) are extended to 
predict that uncertainty about category information would undermine later recognition of another 
person. Experiment 1 provided an initial test of the hypothesis by comparing recognition of faces 
for which category membership was uncertain to recognition of faces belonging to certain 
ingroup and outgroup members. Experiment 2 used a different comparison group (a threatening 
outgroup) in order to rule out two alternative interpretations of Experiment 1. Finally, 
Experiment 3 manipulated category uncertainty without direct reference to outgroup membership 
in order to address the possibility that uncertain group memberships might be redefined as an 
entitative outgroup. Across experiments, results converged to indicate that uncertainty about 
category information undermined face recognition. These results buttress current accounts of 
facial recognition bias by successfully extending them to a new domain, extend theoretical 
treatments of motivation as an antecedent variable in face recognition, apply a boundary 
condition to the influence of threatening stimuli on bias in face recognition, call into question 
recent findings about the cognitive system’s treatment of uncategorized individuals, and identify 
uncertainty as a determinant of person perception. 
Key words: face recognition; social categorization; own-group effect; own-race effect; 
cross-race effect; person perception   




Encountering unfamiliar people involves uncertainty. Upon introduction (or indeed, 
through the early phases of acquaintance) the things we do not know about another person 
usually outnumber the things we do know. Depending on context, such uncertainties sometimes 
matter (e.g. unknown political beliefs when telling an off-color partisan joke), and are sometimes 
irrelevant (e.g. unknown political beliefs when choosing a restaurant). The present paper 
explores the consequences of uncertainty about social category memberships for one of the 
fundamentals of human cognition and interaction, face recognition. 
Uncertainty about social category memberships is important. Social category 
memberships define shard and unshared group membership (i.e., ingroup and outgroup members; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). From shared or unshared group membership, a variety of cognitive and 
interpersonal consequences follow, including perceptual distortion, differential memory, and 
favoritism, (Sporer, 2001; Taylor, Fiske, Ectoff, & Ruderman, 1978; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, & 
Reicher, 1987).  
Although many important categories, such as race, age, and gender, appear to be easily 
ascertained, categorization according to such dimensions is actually a dynamic and probabilistic 
process (Freeman & Ambady, 2011). Categorization of faces by sex, for example, is ultimately 
fast and accurate but involves the accumulation of evidence in favor of both male and female 
categorization before a decision is made (Freeman, Ambady, Rule, and Johnson, 2008). 
Moreover, difficulty with categorization has consequences (Johnson, Lick, & Carpinella, 2014). 
Targets that present conflicting category cues (e.g., relatively feminine heterosexual men) 
prompt disfluency during categorization. Such disfluency in turn translates to negative 
evaluations (Lick & Johnson, 2013).  
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Additionally, not all important group memberships have visual markers. Religion, sexual 
orientation, and political beliefs, for example, do not involve invariant external markers and can 
be difficult to determine conclusively without discourtesy. People can extract information about 
such category memberships based on facial features (Rule et al., 2010a; Rule, Macrae, & 
Ambady, 2009), but such information is less certain and less ubiquitously extracted than is 
information about age, race, and gender (Martin & Macrae, 2007; Tskhay & Rule, 2013; see also 
Todorov & Porter, 2014).  
The impact of known category memberships on the encoding of and memory for new 
faces is well established. The largest body of work in this area concerns the effects of racial 
categories. This work documents that people reliably recognize members of their own race better 
than members of other races (Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Meissner & Brigham, 2001), an effect 
termed the cross-race effect or the own-race effect. More recently, it has become apparent that 
the own-race effect overlaps substantially with a larger class of biases in facial recognition – 
Own-group bias. Work on own-group bias makes clear that intergroup bias in face recognition 
can arise from virtually any meaningful category distinction (Hugenberg, Wilson, See, & Young, 
2013). Own-group bias has been observed as a result of categorization according to sexual 
orientation, religion, politics, university affiliation, and even arbitrary experimentally created 
teams (Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007; Ray, Way, & Hamilton, 2010; Rule, Ambady, 
Adams, & Macrae, 2007; Rule, Garrett, & Ambady, 2010a; Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2012). In 
fact, the general phenomenon of bias in identity recognition appears to extend beyond the 
domain of faces entirely. Own-group bias is also apparent in memory for non-face 
representations of human identity (Ray & Matschke, 2012).  
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One of the interesting properties of categories without physiognomic markers is that they 
highlight the potential for uncertainty about at target’s category membership during face-to-face 
interaction. The extension of the own-race effect to such categories thus raises the question - how 
might uncertainty about category membership affect memory for human faces?  
When people are uncertain about something, they tend to pay attention to things that can 
reduce their uncertainty (Feldman & Fristen, 2010). In the present context, that would mean 
paying attention to information or features diagnostic of category membership. The impact of 
such attention on face memory is not necessarily obvious, however.  
It does not appear to be the case that more attention is always better for face recognition. 
Explicit instruction to attend closely to faces, for example, does not reduce the cross-race effect 
(Hugenberg, Miller, & Claypool, 2007). Rather, attention to different types of information results 
in very different outcomes. For example, examining obvious surface characteristics of faces, 
such as nose length or gender, leads to worse memory for faces than does attempting to extract 
more individual information, such as personality (Bower & Karlin, 1974; Patterson & Baddeley, 
1977).  
In fact, attention to category diagnostic (as opposed to individuating) features is at the 
heart of recent theoretical accounts of bias in face recognition (both racial and otherwise). The 
feature selection model suggests that better recognition of same-race faces compared to other-
race faces stems from noticing race-category diagnostic features instead of distinctive 
characteristics when encoding other-race faces (Levin, 1996; Levin, 2000). The categorization-
individuation model (Hugenberg, et al., 2013; Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010) 
then builds on this insight in three ways. First, it extends the mechanism of category search to 
categories with no veridical visual referent. Presumably, lay theories about the appearance of 
WONDERING IS ENOUGH  6 
 
 
ingroup and outgroup members are sufficient to guide encoding under these circumstances. 
Indeed, the construction of prototypical outgroup faces through reverse correlation gives some 
suggestion of what these features might be (Ratner, Dotsch, Wigboldus, van Knippenberg, & 
Amodio, 2014). Second, the categorization-individuation model links the distinction between 
searching for category diagnostic features and uniquely identifying features to the more general 
concepts of categorization (processing people according to category membership) and 
individuation (processing people according to individual characteristics; Fiske & Neuberg, 
1999). Third, the categorization-individuation model notes that, although intergroup dynamics 
usually motivate people to rely on categorical information when encoding other people who do 
not share salient social categories (i.e., outgroup members), this is not always the case. Some 
circumstances, such as outgroup power (Ackerman et al., 2006; Ratcliff, Hugenberg, Shriver, & 
Bernstein, 2011; Shriver & Hugenberg, 2010), can eliminate category usage in the encoding of 
outgroup members.  
Both of these models suggest that uncertainty about category information would lead to 
processing and outcomes similar to those present for outgroup members. Uncertainty about 
category membership is likely to induce a focus on category diagnostic features. Such a focus is 
in turn likely to impair later recognition relative to other types of encoding. Uncertainty about 
category information might result in greater attention overall, but such attention is likely to be 
directed at facial elements that will not result in effective memory.  
The present investigation presents an important test of the feature selection model and the 
categorization-individuation model. These models can explain known moderators of cross-group 
recognition bias well through attention to categorical or personal information at face encoding 
and through the process of categorization and individuation. Uncertainty about category 
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information presents a novel antecedent condition form both models, however. If the above 
predictions about face recognition under category uncertainty are supported, that would thus 
speak strongly to the models’ generativity and continued efficacy (Popper, 2005).   
Overview 
Current theoretical perspectives on cross-group bias in face recognition suggest that 
uncertainty about a target’s category membership will undermine memory for faces in the same 
way that unshared social category memberships typically undermine recognition of outgroup 
members relative to ingroup members. The research reported here investigated this hypothesis in 
in three experiments. Experiment 1 provided an initial test of the hypothesis by comparing 
recognition of faces for which category membership was uncertain to recognition for faces 
belonging to ingroup and outgroup members. Experiment 2 used a different comparison group in 
order to rule out two alternative interpretations of Experiment 1. Finally, Experiment 3 used an 
alternative manipulation of category uncertainty in order to address the possibility that uncertain 
group memberships might be redefined as an entitative outgroup.   
Sample Size and Other Practical Considerations 
The present research utilized moderately sized samples in repeated measures designs 
(average N = 36). Power analysis suggests that these sample sizes were appropriate given the 
powerful nature of repeated measures designs. Meta-analysis of the cross-race effect indicates a 
large effect size (f = .41; Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Sample sizes as low as N = 15 would be 
sufficient to detect such an effect with 80% power. Downward adjustment to a smaller effect of f 
= .25 on the assumption that the cross-group effect would not be as strong as the cross-race effect 
yielded a recommended sample size of N = 33. Sensitivity analysis using the correlations 
between observations actually observed in the reported experiments (average r = .397, weighted 
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by sample size) confirmed these power estimates. With 80% confidence, Experiment 1 was able 
to detect effects of f = .252 or larger, Experiment 2 was able to detect effects of f = .237 or larger, 
and Experiment 3 was able to detect effects of f = .201 or larger. All measures, manipulations, 
and exclusions are reported. At no point was data collection continued after initial analysis 
because preliminary results were unsatisfactory.  
An additional practical consideration in the present work was contamination of absent 
and concealable category membership by visible social categories, namely race, age, and gender. 
Race, age, and gender are extracted quickly and automatically and have documented effects on 
face encoding (Ito & Urland, 2003; Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Rhodes & Anastasi, 2012; 
Wright & Sladden, 2003). The salient presence of such a competing category has the potential to 
govern face encoding at the expense of less visible or absent category memberships (Ray et al., 
2010). Strong contextual cues can overcome such competing influences (Hehman et al., 2010; 
Shriver & Hugenberg, 2010), but laboratory paradigms examining the influence of concealable 
social category memberships on face recognition are vulnerable to contamination by competition 
from visible category memberships.  
Most existing work on facial recognition bias with concealable categories matches 
stimuli to participant race and age (i.e., uses only white stimuli and white participants and young 
faces with young subject populations) and skirts the issue of stimulus gender by only using male 
stimulus faces (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2007; Hehman et al., 2011; Ray et al., 2010; Rule et al., 
2009; Shriver et al., 2008; Shriver & Hugenberg, 2010); see also (MacLin & Malpass, 2001; 
Pauker et al., 2009). Using race and age matched male stimuli avoids contamination by gender 
categorization because stimulus gender is unlikely to become salient without variation in 
exemplar genders (Young et al., 2009), even among female participants (Hamilton, 1991; Merritt 
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& Kok, 1995). In turn, without category salience, shared or unshared gender would be unlikely 
to influence face encoding (Hugenberg et al., 2010). In this investigation stimuli were matched to 
race and age through demographic screening (i.e., eligible participants were under 30 and white). 
Stimulus images of both genders were utilized, but stimulus gender was matched to participant 
gender at analysis (Experiment 1) or at exposure (all other experiments).1  
Experiment 1  
 Experiment 1 compared recognition for faces about which category information was 
uncertain to recognition for definite ingroup and outgroup members.  
Methods 
Thirty-five participants were recruited for a 3 condition (category information: ingroup, 
outgroup, or uncertain) within-subjects design. Participants were recruited in a university 
cafeteria using chocolate bars as an incentive to participate. The actual experiment was 
completed in a quieter nearby area on a laptop computer. Because of the non-traditional 
recruitment venue, participants were asked to rate how seriously they took the experiment on a 
seven-point scale after they completed the experiment. Participants whose ratings were below the 
scale midpoint (N = 2) were excluded from analysis. The final sample consisted of 33 German 
university students (16 men, 17 women, M age = 23.80, SD = 2.65). 
                                                          
1 This work did not include participant gender as a factor in analysis. The current designs 
do not lend themselves to such analysis because the majority of participants in all experiments 
were female and sample sizes were based on the assumption of a repeated measures design. 
Including participant gender anyway does not qualify any of the results reported in the main 
manuscript or in the appendix, F’s < 2.186, p’s > .149, ηp
2’s < 066.  
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During an exposure phase, participants saw 30 target same gender faces for 3 seconds 
each interspersed with an equal number of extraneous opposite gender faces. In order to match 
participant and stimulus gender, only responses from same gender faces were retained for 
analysis (see Appendix for analysis of recognition and face gender in this experiment). The face 
images were cropped around the chin and forehead to remove most of the targets’ hair. The faces 
were preceded by written information, present for 2 seconds, indicating that a face’s nationality 
was German, French, or unknown. The true nationality of the faces was unknown, although the 
faces belonged to people attending university in the US at the time that the images were created. 
The order of exposure was random and the category membership assigned to particular faces was 
counterbalanced across participants. These exposure conditions were expected to induce 
uncertainty by (a) calling attention to the missing nationality information immediately preceding 
exposure to the face, and (b) juxtaposing categorized faces with faces missing category 
information in the same recognition block.  
After the exposure phase, participants completed a distracter task in which they listed as 
many cities in Germany as they could in three minutes. Participants then completed a recognition 
test in which they saw the same faces they had seen at exposure intermixed with an equal 
number of foils and in which participants indicated whether a particular face was old or new. 
Written information indicating either national category membership or unknown category 
membership was presented in the same way as at exposure.  
Recognition levels were computed for each participant in the metric of d’ in which higher 
numbers indicate better recognition and which accounts for performance on both familiar stimuli 
and foils. Recognition estimates controlled for the variance associated with counterbalancing 
stimulus nationality, which consumed 6 degrees of freedom. All scores were adjusted according 
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to the log-linear approach to accommodate instances of perfect performance (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988).  
Results  
Extension of the feature selection model and the categorization-individuation model 
predicts that uncertain nationality would undermine memory for faces comparably to known 
national outgroup membership. Recognition levels are presented in Figure 1. A repeated 
measures one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition, F(2,52) = 4.180, p = .021, 
ηp
2 = .138. Pairwise comparisons indicated that ingroup faces (M = 1.579, SE = 0.142) were 
better recognized than both outgroup faces (M = 1.242, SE =0.154), F(1,26) = 7.259, p = .012, 
ηp
2 = .218, and faces with unknown category membership (M = 1.155, SE =0.155), F(1,26) = 
6.612, p = .016, ηp
2 = .203. Outgroup faces and faces with unknown category membership were 
recognized comparably, F(1,26) = 0.258, p = .616, ηp
2 = .010. These results conform to the 
predictions derived from the feature selection model and the categorization-individuation model 
of categorical bias in face recognition.   
Additionally, exploratory analyses examined participants’ response criterion in the form 
of C. Negative values of C would indicate that participants were biased towards characterizing 
faces as old (i.e., a liberal response bias). Positive values of C would indicate that participants 
were biased towards characterizing faces as new (i.e., a conservative response bias). The 
experimental manipulations had no effect on response criterion, F(2, 52) = .099, p = 906, ηp
2 = 
.008. Overall, participants appeared neither liberal nor conservative in their responses (M = .023, 
SE = .063), t(32) = .358, p = .722, d = .064.  
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Figure 1. Recognition levels in Experiment 1. Error bars represent cell standard errors. Faces 
were labeled as ingroup members, outgroup members, or category information was uncertain. 
Both outgroup categorization and uncertain category information led to poor recognition 
relative to ingroup categorization.  
 
Discussion 
Although the results from Experiment 1 were consisted with extension of the feature 
selection and categorization-individuation models, two alternative theoretical perspectives could 
also account for the results. One possibility is that that differences in recognition between 
ingroup and outgroup members was driven by enhanced recognition of ingroup faces. The 
recognition levels observed in response to outgroup faces and faces for which category 
information was absent would thus be default and require no special explanation. Indeed, this 
position has been advanced (Van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 2011).  
The findings presented in Experiment 1 could also be interpreted to reflect ingroup over-
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(Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992; Pauker et al., 2009). In the face of ambiguity, the default assumption 
is often that someone is an outgroup member. Poor recognition of faces without category 
information might thus have resulted from those faces being assigned to the outgroup.  
An additional experiment was thus required to provide a second demonstration that 
uncertainty about category information undermines recognition and in order to rule out these 
alternative accounts of Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 used a manipulation similar to that employed in Experiment 1. Faces for 
which category information was unknown were intermixed with faces labeled as ingroup and 
outgroup members and participants’ task was to remember those faces. The key difference 
between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 was the outgroup used for comparison. Experiment 2 
used criminals, a threatening outgroup. 
Outgroups that present a threat or that affect important outcomes are remembered as well 
as or better than ingroup members (Ackerman et al., 2006; Ratcliff, Hugenberg, Shriver, & 
Bernstein, 2011; Shriver & Hugenberg, 2010). Because members of such outgroups are 
personally relevant, people are motivated to process those outgroup members in the same way 
that they process ingroup members. Specifically, people focus on the uniquely individuating 
features of particular outgroup members rather than on their category diagnostic features.  
In the case of uncertain category information, dangerous or threatening outgroup 
membership presents an interesting case. A person’s first priority when presented with an 
unknown individual who might or might not belong to a threatening outgroup is probably to 
determine that person’s group membership (i.e., is this person a potential threat?). Ironically, this 
assessment would require focusing on the categorical features that might be ignored were the 
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person definitely known to be a threatening outgroup member. Because focusing on categorical 
features undermines recognition, extension of both the feature selection model and the 
categorization-individuation model would predict that uncertainty about a potentially threatening 
outgroup membership would undermine face recognition even when certain membership in a 
threatening outgroup would lead to recognition comparable to ingroup membership. Critically, 
this prediction diverges from both an ingroup enhancement account and an ingroup over-
exclusion account of Experiment 1.  
An ingroup enhancement account of Experiment 1 suggests that uncertainty about 
category membership had no effect on processing at all. Rather, enhanced processing of ingroup 
members drove the observed differences. If uncertainty about membership in a normal outgroup 
has no effect on processing, then it is difficult to see why uncertainty about membership in a 
dangerous outgroup category might be expected to suppress recognition. That is, in the context 
of a well-recognized outgroup, an ingroup enhancement account would predict that recognition 
for ingroup, outgroup, and uncertain category exemplars would be the same.  
 An ingroup over-exclusion account of Experiment 1 posits that uncertain category 
membership led to implicit outgroup categorization. If uncertainty about category information 
leads to implicit outgroup categorization, then uncertainty about membership is a well-
recognized threatening outgroup would also be expected to lead to relatively good recognition. 
The uncertain exemplar would be just as much of a threat as a certain exemplar. Like the ingroup 
enhancement account, an ingroup over-exclusion account would thus predict that recognition for 
ingroup, outgroup, and uncertain category exemplars would be the same.  
In sum, an uncertainty account of Experiment 1 would predict that saliently absent 
category information would suppress recognition even in the context of threatening outgroup 
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membership. In contrast, both ingroup enhancement and ingroup over-exclusion would predict 
comparable recognition between saliently absent category information and definitive 
membership in a threatening outgroup.  
Method 
Thirty-six Scottish university students (28 women, 8 men, M age = 19.58, SD = 2.23) 
participated in a 3 condition (category information: ingroup, outgroup, or uncertain) within-
subjects design in exchange for partial course credit. The testing venue was a dedicated 
psychological laboratory. Procedures were otherwise identical to Experiment 1 with the 
following exceptions: All stimuli were matched to participants’ gender; the number of both 
exposure and foil stimuli was increased from 30 to 45; no filler task was used. Participants were 
told that the faces they were viewing belonged either to other students (the ingroup) or to 
criminals convicted of a serious offense (the threatening outgroup) and participants were warned 
that the specific membership of some of the faces (either student or criminal) was unknown. The 
stimulus faces were labeled accordingly (‘student’, ‘criminal’, and ‘unknown’).  
Results  
Extension of the feature selection model and categorization-individuation model predicts 
that uncertain category information would undermine memory for faces relative to both student 
labeled (ingroup) and criminal labeled (dangerous outgroup) faces. Recognition levels are 
presented in Figure 2. A repeated measures one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of 
condition, F(2,60) = 4.058, p = .022, ηp
2 = .119. Pairwise comparisons indicated that both student 
faces (M = 1.404, SE = 0.139), F(1,30) = 7.677, p = .010, ηp
2 = .204, and criminal faces (M 
=1.342, SE = 0.154), F(1,30) = 4.377, p = .045, ηp
2 = .126, were better recognized than faces 
without category information (M = 0.949, SE = 0.163). Recognition did not significantly differ 
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between student and criminal faces, F(1,30) = 0.141, p = .710, ηp
2 = .005. These results indicate 
that saliently absent category information undermined recognition even in circumstances in 
which definitive membership in an outgroup did not interfere with recognition.  
 
 
Figure 2. Recognition levels in Experiment 2. Error bars represent cell standard errors. Faces 
were labeled as ingroup members, threatening outgroup members, or category information was 
uncertain. Membership in a threatening outgroup did not reduce recognition relative to ingroup 
membership but uncertain category membership reduced recognition relative to both ingroup 
and outgroup membership.  
 
Additional exploratory analysis again examined participants’ response criterion (C). In 
contrast to Experiment 1, participants were relatively liberal in their response criterion (M = -
0.513, SE = .106), t(35), = -4.828 p = < .001, d = .803, although the extent of this bias varied by 
experimental condition, F(2, 60) = .099, p = 906, ηp
2 = .008. Pairwise comparisons indicated that 
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(M = -0.768, SE = .174) relative to student faces (M = -0.301, SE = 0.182), F(1, 30) = 9.349, p = 
.005, ηp
2 = .238. Responses to faces of uncertain category membership also tended to be more 
liberal than criminal faces (M = -0.496, SE = 0.176), F(1, 30) = 2.975, p = .095, ηp
2 = .090. 
Response criteria for student and criminal faces did not measurably differ from one another, F(1, 
30) = 1.582, p = .218, ηp
2 = .050. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 provided a second demonstration that uncertain category information 
undermines facial recognition. Experiment 2 thus provided a replication of the key conditions 
under study in Experiment 1. At the same time, the use of a well-recognized outgroup for 
comparison (criminals) ruled out ingroup enhancement and ingroup over-exclusion as alternative 
accounts.   
Participants in Experiment 2 showed a relatively liberal response criterion relative to 
participants in Experiment 1, especially in response to faces of unknown category membership. 
The overall tendency towards liberal responding might reflect the threatening nature of criminal 
targets. In threat recognition, false positives are probably less costly than false negatives. 
Participants might thus have adjusted their overall mindset in response to potentially threatening 
stimuli. Why this would be particularly exaggerated for faces of unknown category membership 
is less obvious. One possibility is that the ambiguity of uncertain category membership might 
have enhanced participants existing response bias. That is, an already liberal response bias 
became more extreme because of the uncertain categorization. 
Although the combined results of Experiments 1 and 2 are consistent with extension of 
the feature selection and categorization-individuation models rather than with ingroup 
enhancement and ingroup over-exclusion, the results could still be explained by one additional 
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alternative account. It is possible that, rather than being implicitly assigned to the existing 
outgroup, uncertain category membership created an entirely new outgroup with properties 
independent of the outgroup already introduced. An additional experiment with a different 
manipulation of uncertainty was required to rule out this final alternative account.  
Experiment 3 
 In order to manipulate uncertainty about ingroup membership without reference to 
outgroup membership, Experiment 3 drew on a paradigm used in early depth of processing work 
on face recognition. In this classic paradigm, participants’ attention was explicitly directed to 
either visible category memberships or to unknown personal characteristics at encoding (Bower 
& Karlin, 1974; Patterson & Baddeley, 1977). Attention to visible category membership led to 
“shallower” processing and worse memory than did attention to unknown personal 
characteristics.  
Experiment 3 replicated this work but directed attention implicitly through uncertainty.  
In the key manipulation of uncertainty, German participants guessed if target faces were German 
or not. In this manipulation, uncertain group membership could not be treated as a potentially 
separate category (as in Experiments 1 and 2). Rather, participants had to speculate about the 
specific membership of uncategorized faces (ingroup or not ingroup). According to the 
predictions derived from the feature selection model and the categorization-individuation model, 
uncertainty about the category membership of these faces would lead them to be recognized 
relatively poorly regardless of whether they were ultimately categorized as ingroup members 
(Germans) or not.   
Experiment 3 is also relevant to ingroup over-exclusion accounts of Experiment 1. In 
Experiment 3, participants explicitly decided if they thought uncertain exemplars were members 
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of an ingroup. Because ingroup over-exclusion identifies the ultimate categorization of 
exemplars as the driving influence on recognition, an ingroup over-exclusion account would 
predict that exemplars assigned to the ingroup would be better recognized than exemplars not 
assigned to the ingroup. In contrast, an uncertainty account of Experiment 1 identifies the 
decision process itself rather than the outcome of the decision as the driving influence on 
recognition. An uncertainty account thus predicts that the eventual classification of exemplars 
would not affect recognition.   
Three comparison groups were useful to evaluate these predictions. First, to account for 
the possibility that asking questions about faces might generally reduce recognition, participants 
were also asked to guess personal information about a different set of faces. Specifically, 
participants were asked to guess if different faces would make a good friend or not. Answering 
questions about friendship quality and answering questions about nationality both require 
attempting to resolve uncertainty about unknown information. The questions differ, however, in 
the degree to which the uncertainty concerns category diagnostic features. Guessing if a target is 
German requires evaluating features diagnostic of the established and commonly used social 
category, German. In contrast, guessing if a target would make a good friend requires searching 
for personally diagnostic (i.e., individuating) information like personality characteristics (Fiske 
& Neuberg, 1990). If simply asking questions about faces affected recognition, then the effect of 
asking questions should be evident after both types of questions. In contrast, extension of both 
the features selection model and the categorization-individuation model would predict that these 
different questions would lead to different recognition outcomes. 
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 Additionally, in order to compare the effects of uncertainty to certainty about ingroup and 
outgroup membership, Experiment 3 also included faces that were explicitly labeled as 
belonging to an ingroup (German) or to an outgroup (French).  
Methods 
Forty-three participants were recruited for participation. As in Experiment 1, participants 
were recruited in a university cafeteria with chocolate provided as an incentive and, after 
completing the experiment, were asked to rate how seriously they took the experiment on a 
seven-point scale. Participants whose ratings were below the scale midpoint (N = 2) were 
excluded from analysis. The final sample consisted of forty-one German university students (12 
men, 29 women, M age = 23.55, SD = 2.51).   
The experiment utilized a four cell repeated-measures design. In two cells, participants 
were asked questions about uncategorized faces (German? Good Friend?). In the remaining two 
cells, participants saw explicitly labeled faces (German, French). The four different encoding 
conditions were divided into two blocks, one block of faces with questions at encoding and one 
block of faces with labels at encoding. The “labels block” used a format identical to Experiment 
1 with two exceptions. Faces were labelled only as “German” or “French,” and the filler task 
consisted of listing either pieces of furniture or animals. The specific filler task was randomized 
between blocks.  
In the “questions block,” each face was preceded by the cue, “German?” or by the cue, 
“Good friend?” Instructions indicated that participants were to determine if the face on the screen 
was German or if the face on the screen would make a good friend according to the cue 
presented before each face. Participants answered each question, “yes,” or, “no,” with a key 
press. Following encoding participants completed the randomized filler task and took a 
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recognition test. The cues present at encoding (i.e., the questions) were also provided during the 
recognition trial. The instructions and presentation format for each recognition trial were careful 
to differentiate between the questions asked at encoding and the decision being made during the 
recognition task, however. No participants indicated confusion about the intended procedures.  
Both blocks contained 40 gender matched faces for a total of 80 faces. Order of stimuli 
within blocks was randomized and the stimuli assigned to particular encoding cues were 
counterbalanced. Block order was counter balanced.  
Recognition levels were again computed in the metric of d’ using the same procedures as 
previous experiments. Controlling for stimulus counterbalancing consumed 8 degrees of 
freedom.   
Results and Discussion 
Extension of both the feature selection and the categorization-individuation model 
predicts (a) that uncertainty about category information would undermine recognition relative to 
uncertainty about personal information, and (b) that this comparison would parallel differences 
in recognition between ingroup and outgroup membership. Recognition levels are presented in 
Figure 3.  
A repeated measures one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of the manipulations, 
F(3,99) = 4.11, p = .009, ηp
2 = .11. Recognition was poor when participants tried to determine 
whether the person pictured was German (M = 1.457, SE = 0.136) relative to when participants 
tried to determine whether the person pictured would make a good friend (M = 1.816, SE = 
0.121), F(1,33) = 8.112, p = .008, ηp
2 = .197. Similarly, recognition was poor when faces were 
labeled as outgroup members (M = 1.574, SE = 0.120) relative to when faces were labeled as 
ingroup members (M = 1.842, SE = 0.108), F(1,33) = 4.310, p = .046, ηp
2 = .116. Recognition 
WONDERING IS ENOUGH  22 
 
 
when participants tried to determine if a face was German did not differ from faces labelled as 
French, F(1,33) = 0.63, p = .435, ηp
2 = .02. These results indicate that uncertainty about ingroup 
membership reduced recognition relative to uncertainty about personal information. Moreover, 
this difference mirrored the difference in recognition of certain ingroup and outgroup members 
with uncertainty about ingroup membership reducing recognition to outgroup levels. 
 
 
Figure 3. Recognition levels in Experiment 3. Error bars represent cell standard errors. 
Questions prompting uncertainty about ingroup membership (German?) were compared to 
questions prompting uncertainty about personal information (Good friend?) as well as to certain 
ingroup membership (German) and certain outgroup membership (French). Uncertainty about 
ingroup membership led to relatively poor recognition comparable to certain outgroup 
membership. Questions about personal information led to relatively good recognition 
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friend?
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In order to determine if it was the decision process itself (i.e., asking the question, is this 
person German?) or the decision outcomes (i.e., deciding that a person is or is not German) that 
drove the observed effects, accuracy was examined according to whether a particular face had 
been classified positively or negatively as an ingroup member or as a good friend. On average, 
participants guessed that 52.1% of the presented faces were ingroup members (Germans). The 
proportion of faces that participants correctly recognized did not differ between faces assigned to 
the ingroup (M = .720, SE = .036)) and faces assigned to the outgroup (M = .762, SE = .036), 
t(30) = 0.933, p = .358, ηp
2 = .028. In fact, the descriptive trend was for faces assigned to the 
outgroup to be better recognized than faces assigned to the ingroup. On average, participants 
guessed 40.8% of the presented faces would make good friends. Once again, the proportion of 
faces that participants correctly recognized did not differ between faces expected to be good 
friends (M  = .831, SE = .036)) and faces not expected to be good friends (M = .877, SE = .029), 
t(30) = 1.095, p = .282, ηp
2 = .038.2 These results indicate that initial uncertainty rather than 
reassignment to an outgroup drove the effects observed in Experiment 3.  
Exploratory analysis again examined participants’ response criterion (C). As in 
Experiment 1, participants appeared neither liberal nor conservative in their responses, (M = 
.065, SE = .086), t(40) = .756, p = .454, d = .118, and the experimental manipulations had no 
effect on response criterion, F(3, 99) = 1.99, p = .120, ηp
2 = .057.  
General Discussion 
                                                          
2 Three participants had no variance in one of the two decisions made about stimulus faces, for 
example, thinking that either all or none of the stimulus faces would make a good friend. This 
resulted in a frequency of zero for one of the response categories analyzed here and thus 
prevented any meaningful computation of a proportion of correct answers. These participants 
were excluded from this analysis. 
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 Three experiments explored the potential for uncertainty about category information to 
influence memory for human faces. Experiment 1 demonstrated that uncertain category 
membership can suppress face recognition. Experiment 2 replicated this finding in the context of 
a dangerous outgroup. Finally, Experiment 3 replicated this finding without reference to 
outgroup membership. Consistent with extension of the feature selection and categorization-
individuation models of intergroup bias in face recognition (Hugenberg et al., 2013; Hugenberg 
et al., 2010; Levin, 1996; Levin, 2000), uncertainty about category information consistently 
undermined recognition.  
 In combination, these experiments rule out several alternative accounts of the data 
presented here. By itself, the finding that uncertainty about category information leads to 
relatively poor face recognition could be accounted for by an ingroup enhancement account of 
intergroup bias in face recognition. This is the idea that recognition at outgroup levels is default 
and ingroup membership elevates recognition from that baseline (Van Bavel et al., 2011). This 
explanation does not easily account for the findings of Experiments 2. In Experiment 2, a 
threatening outgroup was recognized at ingroup levels but the attempt to determine if a target 
was a member of that threatening outgroup led to relatively poor recognition. Because this 
context produced relatively good recognition for both ingroup and outgroup members, it is 
difficult for an ingroup enhancement to explain why uncertainty about ingroup or outgroup 
membership would lead to relatively poor recognition. 
Alternatively, the finding that uncertainty about category information leads to relatively 
poor recognition could be accounted for by ingroup over-exclusion - the idea that people tend to 
be conservative in assigning uncertain exemplars to ingroup categories (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 
1992; Pauker et al., 2009). This explanation does not easily account for the results of either 
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Experiments 2 or 3. Experiment 2 used an outgroup that was as well-recognized as the ingroup. 
In the context of a well-recognized outgroup, assigning uncertain exemplars to that outgroup 
would be expected to lead to relatively good recognition. In fact, uncertain category information 
undermined recognition. Experiment 3 used a task in which participants explicitly decided if they 
thought uncertain exemplars were members of an ingroup. Because ingroup over-exclusion 
identifies the ultimate categorization of exemplars as the driving influence on recognition, 
exemplars assigned to the ingroup would be expected to be better recognized than exemplars not 
assigned to the ingroup. In fact, recognition was not influenced by the eventual decision about 
exemplar membership.     
It is also possible that uncertainty about any sort of information (categorical or non-
categorical) leads to relatively poor recognition. This explanation cannot account for the results 
of Experiment 3, however. In this experiment, uncertainty about personal information led to 
better recognition that did uncertainty about category information. 
Finally, the finding of both Experiments 1 and 2 might be explained by the implicit 
assignment of uncertain category exemplars to a new outgroup, unrelated to the ingroups and 
outgroups explicitly defined in experimental context. Experiment 3 addressed this possibility by 
asking participants to classify uncertain exemplars with respect to ingroup membership. This 
manipulation lead to relatively poor recognition without reference to an outgroup and regardless 
of eventual classification. The implicit redefinition of a new outgroup thus appears to provide a 
poor account of Experiment 3.   
One limitation of this work is that it includes no direct measurement of uncertainty. 
Appropriate measurement of uncertainty in the current context is by no means obvious, however. 
Conscious and reportable experiences of uncertainty, curiosity, or interest would not necessarily 
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index the processes involved in early face categorization. Measurement of computer mouse 
trajectory presents a more subtle possibility but such techniques capture the influence of 
competing evidence on categorization decisions rather than the initial absence of evidence (e.g., 
Freeman, et al., 2008). This weakness is compensated for by relatively clear manipulations in 
Experiments 1 and 2 (explicit labeling and contrast with certain information) and by direct 
manipulation through explicit questions in Experiment 3. The claim that uncertainty drives the 
effects reported here does, however, ultimately rest on the assumption that these manipulations 
were effective in creating uncertainty and that plausible alternative antecedents (i.e., ingroup 
enhancement, ingroup over-exclusion, implicit reassignment to novel outgroups) cannot explain 
the observed results as effectively as uncertainty.  
Recent work related to the phenomenon under study here examined the categorization of 
and memory for multiracial individuals - people whose ancestry blends two or more distinct 
ethnic groups. Most of this work has focused on which of the available parent categories are 
applied to biracial targets of perception. The perception of biracial people appears to follow the 
rule of hypodescent, the tendency to assign people of mixed ancestry to the lower status of the 
applicable parent categories (Halberstadt, Sherman, & Sherman, 2011; Ho, Sidanius, Levin, & 
Banaji, 2011; Peery & Bodenhausen, 2008; but see Chen & Hamilton, 2012). That is, in contrast 
to the results reported here, the perception of multiracial people appears to be governed by the 
outcome of categorization under ingroup over-exclusion rather than by uncertainty (Pauker et al., 
2009).  
Additional work on beliefs about the diagnosticity of visual cues to category 
memberships suggests a potential moderator of the effects reported here. Lick & Johnson (2014) 
found that beliefs about the differential diagnosticity of visual cues to different category 
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membership (e.g., visibility of race vs sexual orientation) varied between individuals. In turn, 
lower belief in cue diagnosticity for a particular category membership affected participants’ 
response criterion in favor of non-stigmatized social defaults (e.g., straight). It is possible that 
such beliefs might moderate the effects observed here by undermining category search. On the 
other hand, such beliefs clearly don’t prevent category search upon prompting. In Lick and 
Johnson (2014), participants’ overall accuracy was not affected by their diagnosticity beliefs. 
Participants were thus able to extract category information from faces even when they did not 
expect to be able to. Similarly, it is not clear if such beliefs operate early enough in processing to 
affect face memory. 
Conversely, contextual or dispositional reactions to uncertainty might influence people’s 
likelihood of engaging in category search. People have different baseline tolerances for 
ambiguity and uncertainty (e.g., causal uncertainty beliefs, need for cognitive closure; Weary & 
Edwards, 1994; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) and people also sometimes actively manage 
uncertainty through intrapersonal processes (e.g., Hogg, 2007). In cases, where people are 
motivated to avoid uncertainty, they might more frequently assume socially a normative category 
membership at the expense of entertaining uncertainty about a category membership.  
In fact, causal uncertainty beliefs might present additional means to link the kinds of 
effects reported here to uncertainty. People with high causal uncertainty beliefs doubt their 
ability to accurately assign causation and thus tend to engage in more extensive searches for 
causal information (Weary & Edwards, 1994). In the context of impression formation, high 
causal uncertainty usually reduces reliance on stereotypes because uncertainty prompts 
consideration of multiple different potential causes for behavior in addition to membership in a 
stereotyped group (Weary, Jacobson, Edwards, & Tobin, 2001). In the context of uncertain 
WONDERING IS ENOUGH  28 
 
 
category membership, high causal uncertainty might instead lead to increased consideration of 
potentially category diagnostic behaviors or characteristics and thus to an increase in the 
influence of uncertainty.  
 The theoretical implications of these findings are broad. First, these findings buttress the 
feature selection and categorization-individuation models of facial recognition bias (Hugenberg 
et al., 2013; Hugenberg et al., 2010; Levin, 1996; Levin, 2000). These models correctly predicted 
face recognition performance under the novel antecedent circumstance of uncertainty. Such 
predictive ability supports the importance and efficacy of these models for understanding facial 
recognition bias. 
At the same time, these findings suggest a refinement of theoretical treatments of 
motivation as an antecedent of intergroup bias in face recognition. Motivation has almost always 
been linked to individuation. To the extent that a target is perceived as relevant, people are 
willing to individuate. If a target is not viewed as relevant people rely on categorical information. 
Cognitive (as opposed to perceptual) bias in face recognition thus occurs because people are 
motivated to individuate ingroup members but not outgroup members (Hugenberg et al., 2013; 
Rodin, 1987; Sporer, 2001). The original articulation of the categorization-individuation model 
(Hugenberg et al., 2010) did emphasize one important example of people being motivated to 
categorize rather than individuate ingroup members (Wilson & Hugenberg, 2010), but that 
example is treated as a theoretically informative exception rather than an important 
characterization of motivation in general.  
In contrast, the research reported here focuses on one everyday circumstance, uncertainty 
about another person’s group memberships, in which active interest in another person prompts 
attention to category information. The current findings make clear that motivation to attend 
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carefully to someone else and attention to categorical information are not necessarily at odds in 
everyday life. A full understanding of the role of motivation in facial recognition bias thus 
requires a more nuanced treatment of the relationship between motivation, individuation, and 
categorization.      
Experiment 2 drew on work demonstrating an important set of circumstances in which 
intergroup bias in face recognition is eliminated, the case of powerful or dangerous outgroups 
and outgroup members (Ackerman et al., 2006; Ratcliff et al., 2011; Shriver & Hugenberg, 
2010). Although Experiment 2’s main purpose was to challenge alternative theoretical accounts 
of the main phenomenon under study here, it also suggests a boundary condition on the influence 
of powerful and dangerous outgroups on face recognition. Such group memberships might 
moderate the own-group and own-race effect only when they are certain. When powerful or 
dangerous group memberships are a potential rather than a certainty, cognitive effort might be 
expended on determining appropriate categorization rather than on individuation.  
The current findings also raise important questions about the most appropriate 
interpretation of evidence in favor of ingroup enhancement accounts of bias in face recognition. 
The ingroup enhancement perspective is based on an experiment (Van Bavel et al., 2011) in 
which participants memorized faces belonging to the members of two teams, thus creating an 
ingroup and an outgroup. Participants later saw the faces they had memorized twice. On one 
occasion, participants had to indicate which of the faces were ingroup members. On the other, 
participants had to indicate which of the faces were outgroup members. Novel faces were 
introduced during these categorization tasks without being identified as novel. Fusiform Face 
Area (FFA) activity was recorded by FMRI during this task. FFA activity was greater in 
response to ingroup faces than in response to outgroup faces. Moreover, FFA activity in response 
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to novel faces was similar to that present for outgroup members. These results were interpreted 
to mean that the processing of ingroup faces is enhanced relative to both outgroup and 
uncategorized faces.  
In fact, introducing novel faces into a task involving the classification of recently learned 
faces might very well have prompted participants to wonder which team the novel face was 
affiliated with. That is, the procedure used to obtain evidence of ingroup enhancement could 
plausibly reflect uncertainty about category membership rather than baseline processing of 
unaffiliated faces. Because both uncertainty about group membership and outgroup membership 
appear to prompt similar recognition outcomes, the observed similarities in brain FAA activity 
does not necessarily reflect ingroup enhancement from a neutral baseline. Indeed, ingroup 
enhancement appears to be at odds with recent cognitive accounts of racial bias in face 
recognition. Sporer (2001), Levin (1996, 2000) and Hugenberg et al. (2010, 2013) all assert that 
unshared category membership is a feature detected by the perceptual system and the detection 
of unshared membership is what modifies processing. These models suggest that default 
processing is modified by the detection of outgroup membership rather than by the detection of 
ingroup membership. Note that ingroup enhancement was only one of several conclusions drawn 
in Van Bavel et al. (2011). The current findings do not suggest reinterpretation of any additional 
points.     
More broadly, the current investigation expands the scientific treatment of uncertainty 
during person categorization. With the exception of recent work on the perception of multiracial 
individuals, traditional approaches to understanding categorization in person perception 
(Duncan, 1976; Dunning & Sherman, 1997; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kunda & Thagard, 1996; 
Macrae et al., 1994; Sagar & Schofield, 1980) leave little room for uncertainty. The 
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consequences of categorization occur because a category was ultimately either present or absent, 
applied or not applied. In fact, the work reported here suggests that uncertainty about category 
information can be as or more influential than the outcome of person categorization.   
Indeed, the principles explored in this work most likely apply to outcomes beyond face 
recognition.  The concept of categorization and individuation were developed in order to better 
understand the likelihood of and reasons for stereotyping (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; D. L. 
Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Macrae et al., 1994). Less directly, a search for category diagnostic 
cues shares much with characterizations of stereotypes as biasing expectancies. Just as encoding 
a face based on categorical features hinders later recognition, encoding behavior through the lens 
of categorical expectancies distorts behavior in category consistent ways (Duncan, 1976; 
Dunning & Sherman, 1997; Sagar & Schofield, 1980). As with face recognition, uncertainty 
about category information might thus emphasize category relevant information in the perception 
of personality and behavior at the expense of uniquely identifying information.   
The practical implications of the findings reported here are succinct and straightforward. 
Intergroup bias in facial recognition might not require outgroup membership. Instead, simply 
wondering about another person’s political beliefs, sexual orientation, religion, or other such 
category membership appears to have the potential to bias processing. 
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Appendix: Analysis of Face Gender and Recognition in Experiment 1 
 Analysis of recognition including both same and other gender faces yields results that are 
difficult to interpret. A significant effect of condition (ingroup, outgroup, or uncertain) still 
emerges, F(2,52) = 4.051, p = .023, ηp
2 = .135, but pairwise comparisons suggest that ingroup (M 
= 1.291, SE = .115) and outgroup (M = 1.230, SE =.116) faces were recognized comparably well, 
F(1,26) = 0.626, p = .436, ηp
2 = .024, whereas faces without category information (M = 1.058, 
SE =.123) were recognized worse than ingroup faces, F(1,26) = 7.029, p = .013, ηp
2 = .213, and 
marginally worse than outgroup faces, F(1,26) = 3.687, p = .063, ηp
2 = .066. These results are 
thus consistent with the prediction that absent category information suppresses face recognition 
but fail to produce intergroup bias in face recognition based on national labels.  
 However, analysis of the effects of stimulus gender on the own-group effect suggests that 
own-gender bias distorted own-group bias based on nationality. A focused examination of group 
labels (ingroup or outgroup) and stimulus gender (same or other) yielded a significant 
interaction, F(1,26) = 6.600, p = .016, ηp
2 = .202. In this interaction, simple main effects showed 
differences between national ingroup faces (M = 1.579, SE = .142) and national outgroup faces 
(M = 1.242, SE = .133) for same-gender targets, F(1,26) = 7.259, p = .012, ηp
2 = .218, but not for 
opposite gender targets (national ingroup M = 1.004, SE = .154; national outgroup M = 1.219, SE 
= .134), F(1,26) = 2.415, p = .132, ηp
2 = .085. Similarly, comparison of recognition for same and 
other gender faces showed significant cross-gender bias among national ingroup members, 
F(1,26) = 14.867, p = .001, ηp
2 = .364, but not among national outgroup members, F(1,26) = 
0.029, p = .866, ηp
2 = .001. These results are consistent with past evidence indicating that 
multiple category distinctions do not necessarily combine additively to influence face 
recognition (Ray et al., 2010; see also Chiroro, Tredoux, Radaelli, & Meissner, 2008; Shriver, et 
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al., 2008). Rather, the presence of a single outgroup membership appears to have the potential to 
cause relatively poor recognition. 
What is the most appropriate analysis strategy in light of the dependency between own-
group national bias and own-gender bias? Own-group effects have been documented with a large 
variety of ingroup-outgroup distinctions (Bernstein et al., 2007; Ray et al., 2010; Rule et al., 
2007; Rule et al., 2010a; Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2012), including German and French 
nationality among German participants (Ray & Matschke, 2012). Similarly, own-sex effects have 
been widely replicated, particularly among female perceivers (Herlitz & Loven, 2013). As both 
the own-group and own-sex effects are observable in the data reported here only when 
competing outgroup memberships are absent, and as competing outgroup memberships have 
documented potential to contaminate the effect on face recognition of a focal category 
distinction, consideration of only same gender faces provides appears to be the most appropriate 
approach to understanding the influence of stimulus nationality in Experiment 1. In light of this 
conclusion, all later experiments adopted gender-matched stimulus faces (i.e., female participants 
saw only female faces and male participants saw only male faces).  
Note that this decision was not meant to imply that the influence of gender on face 
recognition was uninteresting. To the contrary, the influence on face recognition of category 
combinations involving not only gender but also age, race, and additional concealable category 
memberships is an important and relatively unexplored area of research. It is, however, an area 
perhaps best addressed through dedicated investigation.  
 
